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LEGAL IMMUNITY GIVEN TO WITNESSES NEED PROTECT THEM ONLY
IN THE JURISDICTION WHERE TESTIMONY IS GIVEN.
The late case of Jack v. State of Kansas, 26 Sup. Ct. 73, de-
cides that it is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of
law to compel a witness to testify under the Kansas anti-trust act,
where the statute is construed by the state courts to render mater-
ial only such questions as relate to transactions within the state,
and grants full immunity from prosecution in the state courts;
although there is danger that the testimony given in the examin-
ation might incriminate the witness as a violator of the Federal
anti-trust act. The principal ground for so deciding is the fact
that it is highly improbable and it cannot be presumed that under
such circumstances any Federal prosecution would ever take place.
Justices Brewer and McKenna dissented.
It is an ancient principle of the law of evidence, that a wit-
ness shall not be compelled in any proceeding to make disclosures
or to give testimony which will tend to criminate him or subject
him to fines, penalties, or forfeitures. Rex v. Slaney, 5 Carr and
P. 213. It will be observed that the common-law rule extends a
broader privilege to the witness than the words of the Consti-
tution. By the common law a witness in any case, in any court,
was entitled to refuse to answer where the answer would have a
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tendency to criminate him. The common-law rule was embodied
in 14 and 15 Vict. c. 99, sec. 3. It is therefore apparent that the
clause in the Constitution limits and qualifies the common-law rule.
Under the Constitution, it is only "in a criminal case" that a wit-
ness can refuse to answer. Chief Justice Marshall in Burr's Trial,
i Burr's Trial, 244, gave his views in this matter as follows: "What
testimony may be possessed, or is attainable, against any individual
the court can never know. It would seem, then, that the court ought
never to compel a witness to give an answer which discloses a fact
that would form a necessary and essntial part of a crime which
is punishable by the laws."
The extent to which the witness is compelled to answer
such questions as do not fix upon him a criminal culpability is with-
in the control of the legislature. State v. Nowell, 58 N. H. 314.
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision can
only be, that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It would doubt-
less cover such cases; but it is not limited to them. The object
was to insure that a person should not be compelled when acting
as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony that he had
himself committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal
matters; but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks
to guard. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547.
The case under discussion is within the reasoning of the case
of Brown v. Walker, 16I U. S. 591. In that case it was contend-
ed on the part of the witness that the statute did not grant him
full immunity against prosecutions in the state courts, although
it granted him full immunity from prosecutions by the Federal gov-
ernment. This contention was held to be without merit, on the
ground that the danger of such a prosecution was too unsubstan-
tial and remote. Four of the judges dissented. Justice Shira§
in a forcible dissenting opinion said: "It is urged that, even if the
state courts would not be compelled to respect the saving clause
of the Federal statute, in respect to crimes against the state, yet
that such a jeopardy is too remote to be considered. The force
of this contention is not perceived. On the contrary, such is the
nature of the commerce which is controlled by the Interstate
Commerce law, so intimately involved are the movements of trade
and transportation, as well within as between the states, that just
such questions as those which are now considered may be natur-
ally expected to frequently arise. It is certainly speaking within
bounds to say that the effect of the provision in question, as a
protection to the witness, is purely conjectural. No courts can
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foresee all the results and consequences that may follow from en-
forcing this law in any given case. It is quite certain that the wit-
ness is compelled to testify against himself. Can any court be cer-
tain that a sure and sufficient substitute for the constitutional im-
munity has been supplied by this act; and if there be room for
reasonable doubt, is not the conclusion obvious and a necessary
one?" The presence of dissenting opinions in nearly all these cases,
in the face of the doctrine of stare decisis, seems to indicate that
plain logic is not wholly on the prevailing side of the question.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MUNICIPAL REGULATION OF MILK BUSINESS.
The sanitary code of the city of New York confers discre-
tionary power upon an administrative board to grant or with-
hold permission to sell milk within the city. It is held in People ex
rel. Lieberman v. Van de Car, 26 Sup. Ct. 144, that this is a proper
subject for regulation within the police power of the state and,
in the absence of any showing of arbitrary or oppressive exercise
of such power, it will not be considered violative of the right to
due process of law guaranteed by the Fourtgenth Amendment of
the Federal, Constitution. It is further held that it is not denying
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution
to single out the milk business so long as all dealers in the city
are equally affected by such regulation. Equal protection of the
laws is secured so long as the principle of equality is preserved
among all those -engaged in the business. Powell v. Pennsyl-
vania, 127 U. S. 678; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512.
Dealing in milk in a large city is manifestly such an occupa-
tion as necessitates most careful regulation. Wholesome milk
should be insured to the people who are practically helpless to
protect themselves. It is proper for the legislature to delegate
this power to a muncipal board, investing them with power
to pass ordinances not only restricting and conditioninig its supply
and the manner of transporting and keeping it but also licensing
its sale. City of Newton v. Joyce, 166 Mass. 83; Gundling v.
Chicago, 177 U. S. 183; New Orleans v. Faber, 105 La. 208.
A sort of absolute control over persons and property in order
that the health of the community may be secured is one of the
fundamental necessities of government and has from very early
times been vested in a board or in officers, who are not bound to
wait for the slow course of justice but have power to take summary
jurisdiction. In such matters a due process of law is simply a
correct and orderly proceeding observing all the securities for pri-
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vate right applicable to the particular case. A jury is inappropri-
ate and has never been used in this class of cases. "Different
principles are applicable in different cases and require different
forms and proceedings; in some they must be judicial, in others
the government may interfere directly, and ex parte." Story on
Const. (4th ed.) sec. 1943; Cooley's Const. Law, 241. The right
to a particular remedy is not a vested right. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92
U. S. 9o; Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265.
In the light of recent history it may appear that the people
may be called upon to suffer many outrages at the hands of the
average municipal board in which such arbitrary power is vested,
but on the other hand we must consider the absolute necessities
of the case and let our hopes follow the presumption that a public
officer will do his duty. It is on this ground that this and like
ordinances are attacked. Officers may act arbitrarily and in disre-
gard to their duty, licensing one person and refusing another sim-
ilarly situated, giving great chance for monopoly and blackmail
and thereby denying equal protection of the laws and due process
of law. But public officials are presumed to do their duty and
where the grievance is not in fact, the law is to be judged not by
what may be done thereunder in disregard of duty but what may be
lawfully done thereunder. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. I I.
In this case compulsory vaccination was required by an ordi-
nance framed in such broad terms that it might compel a person
to submit when his physical condition would make the operation
dangerous to life. It was held that'while in this supposed case
the authority might not be sustained, yet the complainant, being of
sound body, offered no case for constitutional protection. There
may be a public monopoly granted by law if for public reasons
and if the public is served impartially. Slaughter House Cases,
16 Wall. 36. Where ordinances giving power to license one
and refuse another similarly situated have been brought before the
court on an actual grievance they have been held unconstitutional.
Chicago v. Netcher, 183 Ill. io8; Noel v. People, 187 III. 587.
It is often argued that milk vending is one of the ordinary
vocations of life, which anyone has a right to enter, and though
he may be punished for not conforming to reasonable rules regu-
lating the business he cannot be restrained from engaging in it
altogether. But the police power may be lawfully resorted to for
the preservation of health, even when it involves the summary
destruction of property or deprivation of individual rights, and
what is necessary is largely in the discretion of the legislature.
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; Dunn v. Burleigh, 62 Me. 24.
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Whether the determinations of the board are judicial and re-
viewable by Mandamus or certiorari proceedings, or whether-re-
lief can be had solely through the removal of the board, are ques-
tions suggested in the case but not answered.
"tFORMER JEOPARDY" AS APPLIED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
The Supreme Court of the United States has again shown
the facility with which it can dodge a former decision in order to
attain justice; for the decision in Trono et al. v. U. S., 26 Sup. Ct.
121, is not entirely in harmony with those in Mendezona v. U. S.,
195 U. S. 185, and Kepner v. U. S.* 195 U. S. ioo. In the last
mentioned case the plaintiff in error had been acquitted of the
crime charged against him in the court of first instance, the gov-
ernment appealed and the higher court reversed the judgment of
acquittal and found Kepner guilty of the crime of which the court
of first instance had acquitted him. Upon a writ of error the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the accused had been
twice in jeopardy for the same offense and therefore reversed the
decree of the supreme court of the islands and discharged Kepner.
It was also there held that the government had no power to obtain
a review of a judgment or decision acquitting an accused party,
and if the court had based its decision squarely upon this point
it would not have laid itself open to the remark made at the be-
ginning of this comment, a remark which I do not make upon my
own responsibility, but which I take from the opinion of a major-
ity of the Supreme Court itself; for four of its number, including
the Chief Justice, dissented from the Trono decision, and a fifth,
Mr. Justice Holmes, concurred in the result only, presumably, upon
the same grounds that he dissented from the Kepner decision,
thus clearly showing that he thinks the two decisions inconsistent.
Hence five of the Supreme Court Bench are of the opinion that the
decision in the Trono case is inconsistent with the decision in the
Kepner case. In the Trono case, a man indicted for murder was
convicted of assault in the lower court and himself appealed to the
supreme court of the islands. They reversed the decision of the
court below and convicted him of murder in the second degree.
The Supreme Court of the United States sustains that de-
cision, saying: "The difference is vital between an attempt by the
government to review the verdict or decision of acquittal in a court
of first instance and the action of the accused person in himself
* For comment, see YALx LAW JOURNAL, VoL XIV. page 43.
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appealing from the judgment and asking for its reversal, even
though that judgment, while convicting him of a lower offense,
acquits him of the higher one, charged in the complaint. We do
not agree to the view that the accused has the right to limit his
waiver as to jeopardy, when he appeals from a judgment against
him. As the judgment stands before he appeals, it is a complete
bar to any further prosecution for the offense set forth in the in-
dictment, or of any lesser degree thereof. No power can wrest
from him the right to so use that judgment, but if he chooses to
appeal from it, and to ask for a reversal, he thereby waives, if
successful, his right to avail himself of the former acquittal of the
greater offense contained in that judgment which he has himself pro-
cured to be reversed."
It seems almost certain that justice was maintained in this par-
ticular case, for if a man was guilty of an assault which caused
a death, it is difficult to conceive how he is not guilty of murder.
But this decision was reached by introducing into the law of the
Phillipines the doctrine of implied waiver of the right to plead a
former acquittal, which appears to be a rather arbitrary fiction of
law, as it imputes to an accused an intention which anybody's com-
mon sense must tell him that the accused, as a matter of fact, does
not have. This point impressed Justice Holmes, and in his dis-
senting opinion in the Kepner case, he not only brings it out very
clearly, but in so doing he assumes a hypothetical case very sim-
ilar to the Trono case and predicts that the decision must be as
it later turned out: "If a statute should give the right to take
exceptions to the government, I believe it would be impossible to
maintain that the prisoner would be protected by the Constitution
from being tried again. He no more would be put in jeopardy
a second time when retried, because of a mistake of law in his
favor, than he would be when retried for a mistake that did him
harm. It cannot matter that the prisoner procures the second
trial. In a capital case a man cannot waive and certainly will not
be taken to waive, without meaning it, his fundamental constitutional
rights. Usually no such waiver is expressed or thought of. More-
over it cannot be imagined that the law would deny to a prisoner
the correction of a fatal error, unless he should waive other
rights so important as to be saved by an express clause in the Con-
stitution of the United States."*
In the same opinion he lays down as the original rule, a propo-
sition which if it had been adhered to, would have logically main-
* 195 U. S., 135.
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tained justice and at the same time avoided the confusion caused
by the ramifications from that rule: "The jeopardy is one con-
tinuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the case.
Everybody agrees that the principle in its origin was a rule for-
bidding a trial in a new and independent case, where a man al-
ready had been tried once. But there is no rule that a man may
not be tried twice in the same case."
But it is now too late to theorize upon how logical the law for
the Philippines might have been on this subject, for it is settled; if
we consider the present decisions in their strongest aspect, that the
government has no power to obtain a review of a judgment or de-
cision of the trial court acquitting an accused party, and that if
the accused obtains a review of a judgment or decision of the
trial court, he thereby waives all rights to plead autrefois acquit
as well as autrefois convict in the trial de novo.
THE RIGHT OF A RAILROAD COMPANY TO GRANT TO A CAB COMPANY
THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF ITS CAB STAND.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the recent case
of Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 91, held that a
railroad company may make arrangements with a cab company
to provide cabs for its passengers and may exclude all other cab-
men from its station or depot. This is a question upon which there
has been considerable conflict in the various state courts. At com-
mon law a railroad company is under no obligation as a com-
mon carrier to afford accommodations to hackmen for a trans-
action of their business of carrying passengers to and from the
depots of the company. If, then, it is not obliged to furnish accom-
modations to any, why may it not discriminate?
The cases holding the contrary go upon the theory that when
the company uses its ground as a stand for hacks, it must use it
for the benefit of all and not for the benefit of one in exclusion to
others. They acknowledge that it could probably refuse to allow
any hacks to use its grounds, but argue that when it gives the right
to one it must give the right to all and give equal facilities to all.
If one was disorderly, he probably could be lawfully ejected. A
railroad company can make all reasonable rules and regulations in
regard to its premises and can exclude all persons having no busi-
ness with the company or its passengers; but these cases hold
that it cannot arbitrarily admit one hackman and exclude others
for no other reason than its own profit. Such rules must affect
everyone alike. The granting of such an exclusive privilege is a
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discrimination tending to destroy competition and to encourage a
monopoly which is of course contrary to public policy. Markham
v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523. The contract of the railroad company
does not require that it furnish conveyance either to bring the
passenger to the station or to take him away. The passenger
may employ whatever cabman he pleases to take him to or from
the depot, and any interference with this right is unlawful. Rail-
road Co. v. Langlois, 9 Mont. 419. This is the theory of the dis-
senting cases. See Cravens v. Rodgers, IOI Mo. 247.
One of the strongest cases in support of the railr6ad com-
pany's right to make such a contract is R. R. Co. v. Tripp, 147
Mass. 35. The court holds that a railroad is bound to furnish rea-
sonable facilities for all persons using its road for transportation
from the depot to their destination. If the company sees fit to
give the exclusive right to the use of its depot for the purpose
of soliciting passengers to one hackman, it may do so, provided he
furnishes reasonable services. This does not stop other hackmen,
who have business with the company, from using the depot. They
may bring passengers or baggage to the depot or may take the same
away when they have a contract with the passenger to do so.
But they cannot use the depot for the purpose of soliciting busi-
ness. The hackman is a stranger to both the company and the
passenger and can claim no right to use the station and if he
does use it, he is liable as a trespasser. R. R. Co. v. Tripp, supra.
It would be unfortunate if railroad companies, as against
hackmen, should have no control over their premises. Such a rule
is to be regretted as it would give all the hackmen in a large city
the right to make the premises of the railroad company a hack stand
for the purpose of soliciting passengers. It would prevent the
company from properly protecting its passengers when leaving its
depot. V. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. v'. Flyn, 26 N. Y. Supp. 859.
A railroad company may carry on, in connection with its busi-
ness as carrier, any other business or may use its property in any
way not inconsistent with its duties as a carrier. Its property
is its own and except to the extent to which it has been devoted to
public use, the company may use it for its own profit to the exclu-
sion of others. A railroad company may engage in carrying pas-
sengers in hacks and if it does engage in such business it
has the right to use its own property for such purposes. If
it has such right it can as well employ another to do such service
as to buy hacks and run them itself. If the company has the right
to its platform it has the right to sell such right to
another for a valuable consideration, especially if such
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consideration conduces to the benefit of the public. Any-
one on the premises of the company and not there for the purpose
of coming or going on a train, though perhaps not a trespasser,
may, after request, be ejected. Johnson v. R. R. C., 51 Iowa, 25;
Barney v. Steamboat Co., 67 N. Y. 301. By giving fair notice, a
railroad company may treat as intruders all who come to transact
business with persons other than the company itself. Bleckley,
C. J., says: "It is manifest that the grant of the privilege to one or
more is no rightful cause of complaint on the part of others to
whom a like privilege is denied." Fluker v. R. R. Co., 81 Ga. 461.
The railroad company owning its property and having the pos-
session of it, has the same control of it that a private person would
have under like circumstances provided it discharges its duty to
the public with reference thereto as a common carrier.
Nor does a hackman come within the operation of statutes
regulating common carriers. He has no established route or sched-
ule. He lets his carriages for any length of time and often to a
less number than it will hold. He works or remains idle as he
pleases. For these reasons he does not come within the meaning of
such statutes. The weight of authority is in favor of the right
of the railroad company to grant such an exclusive privilege to a
hackman, in accordance with the doctrine laid down in the prin-
cipal case.
